

## Message Text

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TO USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 141746

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, SA, YE, IR, UAE

SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRESIDENT IRYANI

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA AMMAN  
JIDDA DHAHRAN KUWAIT LONDON TEHRAN TRIPOLI JUL 18, 1973  
FROM SANAA REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE

S E C R E T SANAA 1930

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, SA, YE, IR, UAE

SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRESIDENT IRYANI

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR, SECDEF FOR ISA  
DHAHRAN FOR CHUSMTM

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT PRAISES JORDANIAN EFFORTS  
HERE. CONDEMNS CONTINUING SUADI HOSTILITY. WELCOME  
IRANIAN HELP BUT NOT ITS EFFORTS PRESSURE YAR FOLLOW  
SECRET

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IRANIAN LINE ON ARAB AFFAIRS. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION  
FOR USG WILLINGNESS ASSIST ON EMERGENCY ARMS. FORE-  
CASTS VISIT BY QADHAFL.

2. JULY 17 CALL ON PRESIDENT IRYANI POROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR TOUR D'HORIZON ON DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING MAY 10.

3. I NOTED THAT YARG'S ARREST IN MID-APRIL AND SINCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SUBVERSIVES BEING DIRECTED BY PDRY HAD INEXORABLY AND UNFORTUNATELY LED TO MORE EMPHASIS ON SECURITY AND MILITARY DEFENSE AND LESS ON DEVELOPMENT. WHILE YAR HAD TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE STATE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAD TO BE KEPT IN FOREFRONT OF PLANNING BY NATION'S LEADERS. ARRESTS AND PUBLIC TRIALS (WHICH, I COMMENTED, BEING CONDUCTED WITH COMMENDABLE PROCEDURE AND FAIRNESS) HAD RESULTED IN STEPPED-UP PDRY TERRORISM. THIS IN TURN HAD STRETCHED YARG'S MILITARY RESOURCES VERY THIN AND HAD PRODUCED URGENT REQUESTS TO US AND TO NORTH YEMEN'S OTHER FRIENDS FOR EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION.

4. YEMEN'S FREINDS, I SAID, WERE MOVING TOWARD GOOD RESPONSES TO ITS NEEDS ALTHOUGH EACH IN ITS OWN WAY AND AT DIFFERENT PACE. JORDAN HAD SENT IN ITS FIRST RESIDENT AMBASSADOR, A DYNAMIC AND HELPFUL RETIRED GENERAL. WITH FULL BACKING OF KING HUSSEIN AND PRINCE HASSAN, IT APPEARED THAT JORDAN WAS PREPARED BE ACTIVE IN MANY FIELDS. PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT REACTIONS OF JORDAN AND ITS AMBASSADOR WERE WUICK, POSITIVE AND MUCH APPRECIATED.

5. SAG, I STATED, HAD BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH US OFFICIALS PURSUANT TO GENERAL QABBANI'S VISIT TO DEVELOP LONG TERM PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE LOOKING TOWARD COMPLETE RETRAINING AND RE-EQUIPMENT OF YEMENI ARMED FORCES. HOPEFULLY SAG WOULD SHORTLY BE IN POSITION MAKE KNOWN TO YARG THE RESULTS OF THESE STUDIES. PRESIDENT INTERRUPTED WITH SOME SHARPNESS. HE WAS CONVINCED, HE SAID, THAT SAG WOULD NOT HELP BECAUSE IT DID NOT WANT A STRONG NORTHERN YEMEN EVEN  
SECRET

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THOUGH THIS WAS IN ITS OWN VITAL INTEREST AS A BARRIER AGAINST THE COMMUNIST DANGER FROM ADEN. SAUDI RESPONSE TO YEMEN'S REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY MILITARY SUPPLIES MADE PRESIDENT FEEL HE WAS BEING TRIFLED WITH. SAG'S UTTER LACK OF COMPREHENSION OF HIS SITUATION SHOWN BY RECENT COMMENT ON PRINCE FAHD TO A YEMENI VISITOR THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID COULD BE EXPECTED FROM SAUDI ARABIA UNTIL RUSSIAN ADVISORS SENT AWAY. FURTHER, SAUDI ARABIA HAD CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT BRING ABOUT PRESIDENT'S OWN REMOVAL.

6. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PERHAPS ONLY TIME WOULD SHOW WHICH OF US WAS RIGHT, I SAID I NEVERTHELESS HAD

TO DISAGREE. FROM ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, FROM OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH SAG, AND FROM COUNTLESS CONVERSATIONS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVELS, WE BELIEVED SAG RECOGNIZES THAT YAR IS ITS FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST FURTHER COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENTS ON ITS SOUTHWESTERN FLANK, THAT SAG SUPPORTS OBJECTIVE OF A STRONGER CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SANAA ABLE TO MEET DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS, AND THAT CONTINUED PRESENCE IN OFFICE OF PRESIDENT IRYANI IS VIEWED AS ESSENTIAL. PRESIDENT SHOOK HIS HEAD SAYING THAT HE FORESAW NO PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN SAUDI ARABIA'S SUSPICION OF HIS COUNTRY AND OF HIM PERSONALLY. I SUGGESTED THAT HE LOOK TO THE NEXT FEW MONTHS TO OFFER PROOF THAT THE INTENTIONS OF SAUDI ARABIA, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY US, WERE GOOD. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE HAD FAITH IN US BUT NOT IN SAG.

7. I THEN TURNED TO IRAN AND ITS WILLINGNESS PARTICIPATE GENEROUSLY IN REGIONAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS TO YAR. PRESIDENT ADMITTED IRAN'S POWER AND CAPABILITY BUT SAID SHAH'S PRICE FOR COOPERATION WAS SUBSERVIENT TO IRAN'S POINT OF VIEW ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS. HOWEVER GREAT YEMEN'S NEEDS, THIS WAS NOT A PRICE THAT HE, AS PRESIDENT, WAS PREPARED TO PAY. LAST FALL, IRAN HAD SUMMARILY WITHDRAWN ITS CHARGE AND ITS AID OVER SOME INCONSEQUENTIAL PHRASING IN YEMEN UNITY COMMUNIQUE SIGNED AT TRIPOLI. IRAN WANTED YEMEN TO DECLARE ITSELF OPENLY AGAINST IRAQ, A FELLOW ARAB COUNTRY ALBEIT A TROUBLE-SECRET

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SOME ONE IN MANY RESPECTS. TNSS YEMEN WOULD NOT DO. A VISIT BY LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI WAS IN PROSPECT. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY PRODUCE A COMMUNIQUE ON ARAB CAUSES OF MUTUAL INTEREST. WOULD THE SHAH ONCE AGAIN FAIL TO UNDERSTAND EXIGENCIES OF YEMEN'S POSITION AND AGAIN WITHDRAW HIS OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE? YEMEN WOULD RATHER DO WITHOUT THAN BE DEALT WITH IN THIS FASHION.

8. I SAID I THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT HAD IT WRONG. IRAN REALIZED THAT ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS WERE TO SOME EXTENT INVOLVED IN YEMEN'S SITUATION. ITS DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL WAS QUITE GENUINE. IT HAD EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT, HOWEVER, A REASONABLE RECIPROCITY THAT RESPECTED ITS OWN SPECIAL SENSITIVITIES. IF YEMEN WANTED IRAN'S HELP, AND IT CERTAINLY NEEDED THIS, IT SHOULD BE WILLING TAKE THESE SENSITIVITIES INTO CONSIDERATION. PRESIDENT RELAXED SOMEWHAT AND SAID THAT HE WAS INDEED HOPEFUL OF POSITIVE IRANIAN SUPPORT TO YEMEN AND TRUSTED THAT IN FUTURE IRAN WOULD BEHAVE WITH LESS VOLATILITY AND GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF YEMEN'S CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. I ASKED PRESIDENT IRYANI IF EGYPT HAD LATELY BEEN

SHOWING AN INTEREST IN HELPING YAR MORE IN ITS CONFRONTATION WITH PDRY. HE SAID EGYPT WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF A WILLINGNESS TO HELP, BUT LET IT GO AT THAT.

10. TURNING TO YEMEN'S REQUESTS FOR EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY, I WENT OVER PRESENTATION MADE PREVIOUS DAY TO PRIMIN AL-HAJRI (SANAA 1299) PURSUANT INSTRUCTIONS STATE 138643. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US RESPONSIVENESS AND SAID AGAIN THAT HE HAD NEVER DOUBTED GOOD WILL OF USG TOWARD YEMEN AND ITS PROBLEMS. HE CONFIRMED SHAIKH ZAYID'S WILLINGNESS HELP FINANCIALLY ON EMERGENCY ARMS NEEDS.

11. COMMENT: AS PRESIDENT IRYANI'S REMARKS ONCE AGAIN MADE CLEAR, PROMOTING COOPERATING BETWEEN YEMEN AND SUADI ARABIA IS AN UPHILL TASK FOR USG, AND WILL REMAIN SO UNTIL YARG NOT ONLY INFORMED OF SAG'S LONG TERM INTENTIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT UNTIL THOSE PROGRAMS ACTUALLY UNDERWAY. THE FAULT LIES PERHAPS  
SECRET

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AS MUCH WITH YEMEN'S HYPERSENSITIVITY TO SIGNS OF IMPERIOUSNESS ON PART OF ITS RICH NEIGHBOR AS WITH SUADI ARABIA'S PAST PERFORMANCE IN YEMEN AND WHAT SEEMS TO YEMENIS ITS PRESENT INERTIA IN HELPING TO MEET THE THREAT FROM ADEN.

12. PRESIDENT'S REMARK ON A QADHAFI VISIT BEARS OUT WHAT HAS BEEN STRONGLY RUMORED HERE IN PAST TWO WEEKS. WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHEN VISIT MIGHT TAKE PLACE, YARG OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SPEAKING TO US RECENTLY WITH INCREASING OPTIMISM OF WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND PDRY AND PROSPECTS THAT QADHAFI CAN BE INDUCED COME OUT SQUARELY BEHIND YAR. IF QADHAFI COMES, YARG WILL, AS PRESIDENT HINTED, SEE A STRONG INTEREST IN ACCOMMODATING LIBYAN SUPPORT IN ARMS, MONEY AND POLITICAL PSOTURE AGAINST PDRY. WE WILL BE TAKING APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO COUNSEL QUITE STRONGLY AGAINST YARG PARTICIPATION IN STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD UNNECESSARILY IRRITATE IRAN AND SET BACK THE YAR-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP WHICH CURRENTLY SEEMS TO BE EVOLVING SO SATISFACTORILY.  
CRAWFORD UNQUOTE  
RUSH

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